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Sex, marriage, and parenting are leading issues of our time for reasons 
that philosophers, theologians, and historians will be sorting through for 
centuries.  Meanwhile, the law has to immediately confront the consequences 
of their ascendency; lawmakers are attaching an increasing variety of 
constitutional and statutory rights to sex, marriage, and parenting (hereafter
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SMP), which readily provoke contests about the scope of the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment clauses.
Invisible to most Americans is the fact that SMP beliefs and practices
are foundational to Judeo-Christian cosmology and anthropology.  That 
is, they are inextricably bound up with many religions’ understandings of 
the identity of God, the meaning of life, and how human persons are to
interact with God and one another. 
The growing intensity of legal and cultural preferences for particular 
ethical views about SMP and their power to shape citizens is matched by
religions’ growing difficulties transmitting their SMP-related beliefs and
practices to the next generation. Legislators and judges require religious
actors to conform to new legal and social preferences on SMP using laws
framed as nondiscrimination guarantees; these include bans on hiring
discrimination based upon sex (including pregnancy), sexual orientation, 
choices regarding “reproductive rights,”1 and marriage.  With the recent
Supreme Court decision declaring a constitutional right to same-sex marriage2 
marriage and sexual orientation nondiscrimination laws are more likely 
than ever to be deployed in the context of elementary and secondary 
religious schools’ employment decisions.3 
While a growing number of parents choose to homeschool their 
children as one possible solution to this dilemma,4 this is an impractical 
solution for most, given so many families’ needs for two working parents 
and parents’ varying commitments and abilities.  There is also the question 
of whether regulators will eventually mandate in the homeschooling context 
the same SMP standards mandated in the typical school environment. 
It seems persuasive on its face that the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment preserve a scope of freedom for religious schools that would 
include their authority to require their instructors to support their religious 
1. Reproductive Health Non-Discrimination Amendment Act of 2014, Council of 
D.C. A20-593 (D.C. 2015), disapproved by H.R.J. Res. 43, 114th Cong. (as passed by
H.R., Apr. 30, 2015). 
2.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
3. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Next Fight for Gay Rights: Bias in Jobs and Housing, 
N. Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/us/gay-rights-leaders­
push-for-federal-civil-rights-protections.html [https://perma.cc/2D9A-3ADU] (reporting 
claims that employers discriminate against persons in same-sex unions).  I have chosen to 
focus upon elementary and secondary schools versus higher education, given that more 
employment controversies, as well as religions’ fears about their ability to transmit the 
faith, center upon the former schools. 
4. THOMAS D. SNYDER & SALLY A. DILLOW, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,
NCES 2015-011, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2013, at 124 tbl.206.10 (2015), 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2015/2015011.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NYG-YHXQ] (growing from 2.2% 
of all U.S. students, or about one million children, in 2003 to 3.4%, or nearly two million
children, in 2012). 
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mission in word and deed.  Near the core of religious freedom, both
historically and by current lights, is the government’s duty to leave religious 
doctrine and teachers alone.5 
On their face, however, leading Free Exercise cases and current statutory 
law do not make it readily apparent that the freedom to select teachers will 
be preserved. In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, the Supreme Court provided only minimal rational basis 
protection for “neutral laws of general applicability,”6 a category into which 
employment nondiscrimination laws seem easily to fit.  Furthermore, in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, the Court’s holding might be interpreted to clearly
stay governmental meddling in the decisions of religious employers only
in the case of a narrowly defined category of “ministers”;7 it is not certain 
under this test that all teachers in religious schools will qualify.  Title
VII’s—employment nondiscrimination law—exception for religious
employers to make personnel decisions consonant with their religion8 is 
also insufficient in practice, given how judicial inquiries easily transgress 
the boundaries between law and religious doctrine, effectively imposing upon 
schools teachers whose choices contradict schools’ religious missions.9  And
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (hereinafter RFRA),10 though not
without teeth, is of uncertain use, given how the state can overcome even 
significant burdens on religious freedom by a demonstration of a “compelling
state interest,” which appears to be an uncertain, often subjective 
determination.11  A recent declaration by the ACLU—one of the groups 
that lobbied to pass RFRA—claims even that “any burden on the free
exercise of religion imposed by an antidiscrimination statute is outweighed
by the compelling state interest in eradicating discrimination and promoting
 5. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 
694, 702–05 (2012) (reciting the history of “[c]ontrovers[ies] between church and state
over religious offices”). 
6. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4 (2012)), as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859–60
(2015).
7. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. 
8.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2012). 
9. See infra, Part IIC.
10.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4 (2012)). 
11. See infra, Part II.C.
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equality.”12  The ACLU has now officially withdrawn its support for
RFRA.13 
A closer look at both Smith and Hosanna-Tabor indicates, however, that
both are amenable to protecting religious schools’ interests in determining 
their instructors. Neither case anticipated the laws and legal environment
regarding SMP today, but both contain structural principles—Smith’s to
avoid “anarchy” and Hosanna-Tabor’s to allow religions to transmit their 
faith14—which are better satisfied when the religious schools’ freedom to
determine their faculty is preserved. Interestingly, Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion in Obergefell  v. Hodges, while incorrectly reciting the 
full scope of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise guarantee, axiomatically 
recognized the rights of “religious organizations and persons” to “advocate” 
and “teach” “the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives 
and faiths and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family
structure they have long revered.”15  Even though Justice Kennedy’s very
brief attention to First Amendment rights left out most of its contents, he 
grasped that part of its core consists of religious actors’ right to teach. 
There are several avenues available for protecting religious schools’
freedom but none involving rote application of the summary holdings of 
Smith or Hosanna-Tabor.  This shouldn’t surprise; little is simple where 
the religion clauses are concerned.  Nevertheless, to provide free exercise
and nonestablishment “on the ground” and to allow core tenets of Judeo-
Christian traditions a genuine, not just theoretical, chance of reaching the 
next generation, the Supreme Court needs to find a way within the 
labyrinth of its current First Amendment jurisprudence to allow religious
schools and parents the freedom to teach.
This Article will treat this question as follows.  Part I will briefly consider
the relationship between SMP issues and fundamental Judeo-Christian 
doctrines concerning God and the world.  It will also treat difficulties 
today facing the task of conveying faith to the next generation without the 
12. Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 13, Herx v. Diocese 
of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-122-RLM-RBC (N.D. Ind. Sept. 17, 2012) 
(“[T]he Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination
in education . . . [which] outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on
petitioners’ exercise of their religious beliefs.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983))). 
13. Louise Melling, Opinion, ACLU: Why We Can No Longer Support the Federal 
“Religious Freedom” Law, WASH. POST (June 25, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/congress-should-amend-the-abused-religious-freedom-restoration-act/2015/06/ 
25/ee6aaa46-19d8-11e5-ab92-c75ae6ab94b5_story.html [https://perma.cc/SRC2-VWLL].
14. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 
694, 698 (2012); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990), superseded by statute, 
RFRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4. 
15.  135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). 
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assistance of an integrated religious education.  Part II will consider various
interpretations of the leading cases and statutes governing religious freedom
respecting employment and conclude that there are available interpretations
which would allow religious schools authority over their own staff.  The 
Conclusion frames the concrete solutions that these interpretations
suggest. 




Most observers likely believe that Judeo-Christian teachings on SMP 
are only a matter of “rulemaking” about licit sexual behavior.  The reality
is quite different. Jewish and Christian scriptures instead teach that
human sexual relations, procreation, and marriage are reflections of 
deeper, higher, and ultimate truths about the most central matters of each
faith: the identity of God, God’s way of loving us, and God’s intentions for 
human love.  I have treated this matter at much greater length elsewhere,16 
but offer a brief summary here, in order simply to establish the religious 
quality of religious schools’ employment policies touching upon SMP. I
will also consider here the difficulty of parents’ and religions’ passing on 
their faith in a culture and legal system increasingly teaching children that
sexual expression is a human right, unrelated both to children and to
marriage.
There is a great deal of religious scholarship on the links between
human practices respecting SMP and divine realities.  A new volume 
collecting the teachings of a dozen religious traditions, including Catholicism,
Protestantism, and Judaism, makes the point succinctly and will be relied
upon here: Not Just Good, but Beautiful: The Complementary Relationship
Between Man and Woman.17 
For Catholics, the deeper realities represented by SMP are “at the center 
of” the faith.18  In the spring of 2015, for example, reflecting Genesis’ 
16. Helen M. Alvaré, Religious Freedom Versus Sexual Expression: A Guide, 30
J.L. & RELIG. (forthcoming 2015). 
17. NOT JUST GOOD, BUT BEAUTIFUL: THE COMPLEMENTARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
MAN AND WOMAN (Steven Lopes & Helen Alvaré eds., 2015). 
18. Maike Hickson, Cardinal Rebukes Head of German Bishops: We Can’t Ignore 


















    
 
 
   
 
 




     
 
     
  
   
  
 
      
   
language about the “image of God”19 being manifested in the “alliance of 
the man and woman,” Pope Francis observed that modern human beings’ 
failure to grasp the unique importance of the one-flesh human marriage 
between a man and a woman is mirrored in their difficulties understanding
and loving God.20  They will struggle especially to grasp that God is “three
in one,” a Trinity of three persons in an eternal loving communion, like
the mother, the father, and the child.21 
It is also a core element of Catholic doctrine on marriage, from the time
of St. Paul to today, that marriage between a man and a woman, open to
children, is an irreplaceable way of understanding how God loves the
human person and how we are to love one another.22  In his most current 
and environmental encyclical—Laudato Si’23—Pope Francis confirmed 
the relationship between Christian anthropology and cosmology and the 
importance to Christian belief of a proper understanding of both sexes, 
interrelated and welcoming children, “based on the fact that ‘[m]an too 
has a nature that he must respect and that he cannot manipulate at will.’”24 
Pope Francis’ more recent expressions of these ideas are brief but useful
summaries of extraordinarily lengthy and theologically rich materials 
written by Saint John Paul II, not only before he became pontiff,25 but also 
in hundreds of papal “audience” presentations, pastoral letters, speeches,
and encyclicals.26  Never before in the history of the Catholic church has
 19. Genesis 1:27. 
20. Pope Francis, Address to the General Audience at St. Peter’s Square: The 
Family-10. Male and Female (I) (Apr. 15, 2015) (transcript available at https://w2.vatican.va/ 
content/francesco/en/audiences/2015/documents/papa-francesco_20150415_udienza­
generale.html [https://perma.cc/F3W8-JMHN]) (“I wonder if the crisis of collective trust 
in God, which does us so much harm, and makes us pale with resignation, incredulity and 
cynicism, is not also connected to the crisis of the alliance between man and woman.”). 
21. Pope Saint John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation at St. Peter’s: Familiaris Consortio
(On the Role of the Christian Family in the Modern World) paras. 19, 21 (Nov. 22, 1981)
(transcript available at http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_exhortations/ 
documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_19811122_familiaris-consortio.html [https://perma.cc/B26E-9NP9]).
22. Ephesians 5:31–32 (New American Standard) (“For this reason a man shall 
leave his father and mother and shall be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one 
flesh.  This mystery is great, but I am speaking with reference to Christ and the church.”).
23. A letter addressed to the entire world on a matter of contemporary urgency—in 
the case of Laudato Si’, regarding the natural and social environment of human beings. 
24. Pope Francis, Encyclical Letter Laudato Si’ (On Care for Our Common Home)
para. 155 (May 24, 2015) (quoting Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the German Bundestag, 
Berlin: The Listening Heart: Reflections on the Foundations of Law (Sept. 22, 2011) 
(transcript available at https://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2011/september/
documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20110922_reichstag-berlin.html [https://perma.cc/5TLK-J7Y2])). 
25. See KAROL WOJTYLA, LOVE AND RESPONSIBILITY (Harry T. Willetts trans., Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1981) (1960). 
26. See Alvaré, supra note 16. 
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the relationship between human SMP choices and Catholic life and
doctrine been so thoroughly explored.
Speaking from a Protestant perspective, perhaps the leading Scripture 
scholar of the contemporary era, Reverend N.T. Wright, has written that 
the Genesis account of the “man and the woman together [is] a symbol of 
something which is profoundly true of creation as a whole.”27  He elaborates: 
[This account is] itself a signpost pointing to that great complementarity of God’s
whole creation, of heaven and earth together. . . .  [T]he new Jerusalem is coming
down from heaven like a bride adorned for her husband, [which is] the symbolism 
of marriage, of male and female coming together (only now it is the church which 
is the new Jerusalem, coming together with Christ as the bridegroom)[.] 
Now it’s important to begin with that big picture. Because if we don’t, we can
very easily imagine that what the Bible has to say about men and women, about 
marriage, about all that follows from and surrounds that complicated and rich and
exciting topic, is simply a set of rules.  And part of the problem of what we’ve 
done in the Western church for so long is that we have imagined that we are 
supposed to leave earth and go to heaven and that how we behave at the moment 
is simply in accordance with a bunch of rules that God happens to have given us.
They might’ve been different; they happen to be like this.  And according to how
we measure up to them, or not, we may or may not get to heaven. 
Now that isn’t just a parody [of the truth].  That’s actually a radical distortion
of what the Bible is all about.  As humans we are called to live as symbols of the
creation, which was given at the beginning and which is to be consummated, as
in Revelation, at the end.
. . . At the end of the great chapter we call Romans 8, one of the finest, most 
extraordinary passages in the whole of the New Testament, we find Paul
expounding with delight and almost glee the sense that the whole creation is on
tiptoe with expectation because it is going to be set free from its bondage of decay
to share the liberty of the glory of the children of God.  And what he’s talking 
about there is the imagery of birth, of new birth, which, of course, goes very
closely with the imagery of marriage.  These are signposts; they are pointers to
the fact that this is what the whole creation was made for.
. . .  [T]he vocation . . . of husbands and wives is not identical with, but is 
modeled on, and symbolizes, the relationship between Christ and the church[.]
. . .  Every time I, as a priest, celebrate the marriage of a couple, I remind
myself, and I frequently remind [the couple], that what we are doing is setting up
a signpost. . . . [T]hat signpost [is pointing] to the fulfillment of God’s good
 27. Humanum, N.T. Wright, YOUTUBE.COM (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=AsB-JDsOTwE.
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purposes for creation, the coming together of all things in heaven and on earth in
Christ.28 
Jewish theology is also grounded in its scriptures about SMP.  In the
words of one of the leading rabbis in the Western hemisphere, Rabbi Lord 
Jonathan Sacks: 
[R]egardless of how we read the story of Adam and Eve—and there are 
differences between Jewish and Christian readings—the norm presupposed by
that story is: one woman, one man.  Or as the Bible itself says: “That is why a 
man leaves his father and mother and is united to his wife, and they become one
flesh. 
. . . .
. . .  What covenant did, and we see this in almost all the prophets, was to
understand the relationship between us and God in terms of the relationship
between bride and groom, wife and husband.  Love thus became not only the 
basis of morality but also of theology.  In Judaism faith is a marriage. 
. . . . 
So that is one way of telling the story, a Jewish way, [including] . . . the way
marriage shaped our vision of the moral and religious life as based on love and
covenant and faithfulness, even to the point of thinking of truth as a conversation
between lover and beloved.  Marriage and the family are where faith finds its
home and where the Divine Presence lives in the love between husband and wife, 
parent and child. 
. . . .
. . .  [W]hen a man and woman turn to one another in a bond of faithfulness, 
God robes them in garments of light, and we come as close as we will ever get to
God himself, bringing new life into being, turning the prose of biology into the 
poetry of the human spirit, redeeming the darkness of the world by the radiance 
of love.29 
In short, matters of the relationship between the man and the woman are 
unquestionably near the heart of the faith of several religious traditions 
very prominent in the United States.  Yet in the United States today,
notions about SMP entirely opposite to these religious traditions are
increasingly proposed as somewhere near the core of freedom and
happiness, and saturate the “messaging” reaching children and adolescents 
via news media, entertainment, advertising, and even law.  In the accurate
summary of First Amendment scholar Steven D. Smith, there has been an
“impressive advance of a formidable political and cultural movement that
marches under the banner of ‘equality’ and that bids to become a new 
28. Id.
 29. Jonathan Sacks, Seven Key Moments in History: A Jewish Perspective, in NOT
JUST GOOD, BUT BEAUTIFUL supra note 17, at 20, 23, 25, 28, 32. 
8
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national orthodoxy with features reminiscent of those that characterized
state-supported orthodoxies during the centuries of Christendom.”30 
There is a great deal of data supporting this conclusion, but several 
references can accurately sketch the situation.  Perhaps the nation’s most
prominent organization addressing the SMP beliefs and practices of
young people, the National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned
Pregnancy, issued a landmark report on the relationship between media 
consumption—Internet, TV, movies, advertisements, and magazines— 
and children’s and teens’ beliefs and practices concerning SMP.  Its
topline conclusions were broad: “Media is the air our teens breathe.”31 
One study concluded that “less than one half of 1% of the [media young 
adolescents use frequently] included information about or depictions of 
sexually healthy behavior.”32  Children and youth “spend more time using
media than they do engaged in any other activity.”  Sexual content there 
“is prevalent and easy to access . . . even at very young ages.”  “[Y]oung
people can obtain sexual images, narratives, and information more easily
than ever before [and] . . . can access more explicit pornography . . . than 
most of their parents have seen in their lifetimes.”  “[S]exual portrayals in 
media are increasingly frequent and explicit.”33  On the four major networks,
71% of programs exhibit sexual content in a given year, featuring 6.1 sex 
scenes per hour.34 The presence of gay and lesbian characters is increasing.35 
In the top fifty grossing films even twenty years ago, there were thirty  sex 
scenes.36  The leading adolescent magazine doubled its sexual content 
30.  Steven D. Smith, The Last Chapter? 41 PEPP. L. REV. 903, 906 (2014). 
31. MICHAEL RICH ET AL., NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN & UNPLANNED 
PREGNANCY, MANAGING THE MEDIA MONSTER: THE INFLUENCE OF MEDIA (FROM 
TELEVISION TO TEXT MESSAGES) ON TEEN SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND ATTITUDES 5 (Jane D.
Brown ed., 2008), https://thenationalcampaign.org/sites/default/files/resource-primary-down
load/media_monster.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP7Y-HXLZ].
32. Stacey J.T. Hust et al., Boys Will Be Boys and Girls Better Be Prepared: An 
Analysis of the Rare Sexual Health Messages in Young Adolescents’ Media, 11 MASS
COMM. & SOC’Y 3, 4 (2008), cited in id. at 7 n.4. 
33. RICH ET AL., supra note 31, at 30. 
34. Id. at 23 n.43 (citing Kirstie M. Farrar et al., Sexual Messages During Prime-
Time Programming, SEXUALITY & CULTURE, Summer 2003, at 7, 16).
35. Thirty-two primetime scripted series in 2014 featured gay and lesbian
characters, up 20% from the prior year, according to GLAAD, 2014 WHERE WE ARE ON 
TV, at 4 (2014), http://www.glaad.org/files/GLAAD-2014-WWAT.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
D3RP-BAUX].
36. RICH ET AL., supra note 31, at 23 n.47 (citing Jana Bufkin & Sarah Eschholz, 
Images of Sex and Rape: A Content Analysis of Popular Film, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
1317, 1329–30 (2000)). 
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between 1974 and 1994.37  And in advertising directed to magazines with
youth readership, there is a far greater likelihood of showing couples 
involved in sexual activity.38 
Pornography is also a growing factor.  A great deal of children’s exposure
to pornography is uninvited.  By 2005, among youths ten to seventeen
years old, 42% had been exposed to online pornography, two-thirds of 
which was uninvited.39 
Studies consistently show that getting sexual information from the 
media is associated with “beliefs that increase the likelihood of having
sexual intercourse” among adolescents.40  “The kinds of media young
people . . . use every day typically portray early, unprotected sexual 
behavior as normative, glamorous, and risk-free.”41 
While there is not agreement about the “pathways,” such as cultivation, 
disinhibition, overwhelming real-life information, “superpeer” effect, and
role modeling,  linking exposure to sexualized media, to attitudes and
behaviors regarding nonmarital sex, there is agreement that the influence 
is real.42  One should add to the column of media influence, frequent news 
reports claiming that religious believers regularly fail to observe their own
religious teachings respecting SMP, on the grounds that they are irrational 
or even impossible.43 
Increasingly, governments endorse notions about SMP which directly
contradict religions’ respect for the categories of male and female, for the 
importance of the sex/procreation link, and for the unique importance of 
the male/female alliance.  Moving away from prior values and positions 
37. Id. at 22 n.35 (citing Laura M. Carpenter, From Girls into Women: Scripts for 
Sexuality and Romance in Seventeen Magazine, 1974–1994, 35 J. SEX RES. 158, 162 
(1998)).
38. Id. at 22 n.39 (citing Tom Reichert, The Prevalence of Sexual Imagery in Ads 
Targeted to Young Adults, 37 J. CONSUMER AFF. 403, 408 (2003)).
39. Id. at 25 n.67 (citing Janis Wolak et al., Unwanted and Wanted Exposure to
Online Pornography in a National Sample of Youth Internet Users, 119 PEDIATRICS 247, 
247 (2007)).
40. Amy Bleakley et al., How Sources of Sexual Information Relate to Adolescents’
Beliefs About Sex, 33 AM. J. HEALTH BEHAV. 37, 47 (2009). 
41. RICH ET AL., supra note 31, at 7 n.3 (citing Susannah Stern & Jane D. Brown, 
From Twin Beds to Sex at Your Fingertips: Teen Sexuality in Movies, Music, Television, 
and the Internet, in CHANGING PORTRAYAL OF ADOLESCENTS IN THE MEDIA, 1950 TO 2005,
at 313, 335–38 (Patrick Jamieson & Daniel Romer eds., 2008)).
42. See Amy Bleakley et al., Impact of Music, Music Lyrics, and Music Videos on
Children and Youth, 124 PEDIATRICS 1488, 1491 (2009); see also RICH ET AL., supra note 
31, at 20, 22, 23 (summarizing studies showing exposure to sexual material through media 
increases adolescent sexual behavior).
43. See, e.g., Frank Bruni, Opinion, Be Fruitful, Not Bananas: Pope Francis, Birth
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at great speed, governments and important private institutions are instead
promoting and funding technological reproduction,44 legal abortion and 
transgender surgeries,45 celebrating nonmarital sex,46 and supporting state 
recognition for same-sex unions as marriage.  It is not clear how religious 
leaders and families would pass on their faith in this milieu, without
consistent and persistent teaching in word but also in deed.  This is part of
the reason why religions found schools. 
A typical Catholic school mission statement begins: 
Catholic Schools form Catholic students to be full and practicing members of 
the Church, are centers of evangelization that call all to live fully the message of
Jesus Christ, and are centers of academic excellence that rigorously prepare
students to be life-long learners and contributing members of the global community.47 
Catholic schools are also increasingly likely to be sensitive to the difficulty 
of communicating about hot-button issues.  The above mission statement 
continues: “Advances in technology . . . and the contradictions in societal 
values make the availability of a vibrant, relevant, rigorous Catholic 
education more important than ever.  We must provide our young people 
with the tools and direction they need to function amid these challenges[.]”48 
This is also an important element in religious parents’ turning to religious 
schools. For example, one Catholic mother wrote: 
We know we can’t do it alone.  I’d like to believe that John and I can ensure that 
our children want to have a personal relationship with their Lord and Savior, that 
they’ll grow to value the Catholic faith, and that they’ll learn to treasure our
Church. But I don’t consider that a given.  Of course, John and I will do all we
can, but I also know how children learn from others who are not their
44.  Katie Falloon & Phillip M. Rosoff, Who Pays? Mandated Insurance Coverage 
for Assisted Reproductive Technology, 16 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 63, 64–65 (2014), 
http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2014/01/pdf/msoc1-1401.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA5Y-SFQ5].
45. Katie J.M. Baker, More Elite Colleges Are Covering Sex-Change Surgery and
Other Transgender Student Needs, JEZEBEL (Feb. 13, 2013, 10:50 AM), http://jezebel.com/
5983915/more-elite-colleges-are-covering-sex-change-surgery-and-other-transgender­
student-needs [https://perma.cc/U74B-29CJ]. 
46. Kurtis Lee, Pro-Obamacare Ads Targeting Millennials Stir Controversy in
Colorado, DENVER POST (Nov. 12, 2013, 5:48 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/politics/ 
ci_24509632/pro-obamacare-ads-targeting-millennials-stir-controversy-colorado [https://perma.
cc/5JP9-85RT]. 
47. Mission, Vision, Belief Statements, ARCHDIOCESE OF PHILA., https://web.archive.
org/web/20141129130913/http://www.catholicschools-phl.org/about-oce/mission-vision­
belief-statements [https://perma.cc/G28J-L6JF] (last visited Feb. 5, 2015). 
48. Id.
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parents.  Especially in today’s world, we can use all the help we can get.  And we 
are so grateful to be able to turn to Catholic schools.49 
It is obviously true that children will be more inclined to believe what 
their faith teaches and that it is “doable” in their lives if they have before 
them the example of teachers faithfully living out their religious beliefs 
with peace and integrity. This needs to be acknowledged as a matter of
common sense: the person of the teacher importantly influences the
student.50  As a matter of long personal experience with the small community 
that is a religious school, I can report that teachers’ personal examples— 
exemplary or problematic—are a regular subject of conversations among 
parents and parishioners, focused on the question of their influence on 
impressionable children.  In fact, the Supreme Court has regularly in the
past acknowledged this dynamic as an element of its reluctance to permit 
states to provide funds directly to religious schools. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
for example, after describing the standards for teachers applicable in the
Catholic schools at issue—requiring them to undertake “religious formation,” 
which is not “restricted to a single subject area,” and recognizing that the
teachers are the “prime factor” for the schools’ success in transmitting 
the Catholic faith—the Court observed, “Given the mission of the church 
school, these instructions are consistent and logical.”51 
The next Part turns to questions about whether the First Amendment 
religion clauses protect religions’ and parents’ rights to determine the
character of their faculty. 
II. SMITH, HOSANNA-TABOR, OBERGEFELL, AND A RIGHT TO
 
TEACH THE NEXT GENERATION
 
There is something immediately persuasive about the proposition that
the state should not determine the instructors or instruction at religious
elementary and secondary schools.  But, of course, few things in life are 
perfectly straightforward, especially those intersecting the First Amendment’s
religion clauses. Where some would see such state action as an intrusion 
into internal religious affairs, others would see anarchy and scandal in 
49. Rita Buettner, 10 Reasons We’re Choosing Catholic Schools for our Children, 
CATHOLIC REV. (Jan. 30, 2013, 8:32 PM), http://catholicreview.org/blogs/open-window/
2013/01/30/10-reasons-were-choosing-catholic-schools-for-our-children#sthash.ZrjotXan.
dpuf [https://perma.cc/V426-A684] (emphasis removed). 
50. See e.g., Alix Spiegel, Teachers’ Expectations Can Influence How Students 
Perform, NPR: MORNING EDITION (Sept. 17, 2012, 3:36 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/
health-shots/2012/09/18/161159263/teachers-expectations-can-influence-how-students­
perform [https://perma.cc/2S2Y-JSHV].
51. 403 U.S. 602, 618 (1971) (citing Handbook of School Regulations for the Diocese
of Providence). 
12
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allowing institutions that educate and employ citizens to ignore what they
characterize as human rights of women or same-sex-attracted citizens.
They would characterize a religious exemption as licensing religion to 
deny some citizens’ dignity.  They would find this particularly egregious 
in the sphere of education involving the formation of impressionable 
children. 
These types of beliefs are already being brought to bear on religious 
schools’ personnel and teachings via laws banning “discrimination” on
the basis of sex or sexual orientation and “reproductive choices.”52 Now
that the Supreme Court has introduced same-sex marriage into the fifty 
states as a constitutional right,53 schools can expect additional lawsuits on 
the grounds of marital or sexual orientation discrimination in connection
with their refusals to hire or retain a person who enters into a same-sex
union recognized by the state as a marriage. 
Opponents of constitutional exemptions for religious schools believe 
that they have important Supreme Court precedents on the side of applying
employment nondiscrimination laws to religious schools’ teachers. They
conclude that these are “neutral laws of general applicability” under 
Smith, such that the state can burden religion upon demonstrating that the 
law bears a mere “rational relationship” to a “legitimate state interest.”54 
They also feel confident that most or all teachers in religious schools are 
not included within the ministerial exemption articulated by Hobby Lobby
due to factors such as their titles or their formal job descriptions.55 
Yet their confidence feels misplaced.  The prospect of the state imposing 
particular instructors into religious schools is historically suspect and
clearly intrusive.  It gives off more than a whiff of both Free Exercise and
Establishment violations.  It feels opposed to parents’ rights to determine 
the education of their children and to citizens’ right of association; as
Justice Alito noted in his Hosanna-Tabor concurrence: “Religious groups 
are the archetype of associations formed for expressive purposes, and their
fundamental rights surely include the freedom to choose who is qualified
 52. See Reproductive Health Non-Discrimination Amendment Act of 2014, Council
of D.C. A20-953 (D.C. 2015), disapproved by H.R.J. Res. 43, 114th Cong. (as passed by
H.R., Apr. 30, 2015). 
53.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
54. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990), superseded by statute, RFRA, 
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb 
to -4 (2012)). 
55.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2763 (2014). 
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to serve as a voice for their faith.”56  At the same time, despite the intuition 
that government’s choosing the faculty of religious schools seems 
constitutionally problematic, the language of Smith and of Hosanna-Tabor
does not give sure comfort to religious freedom claimants, as already noted 
above. 
There is a great deal of scholarship already discussing potential limits
to Smith,57 the borders between Smith- and Hosanna-Tabor-type cases,58 
and the scope of Hosanna-Tabor’s ministerial exemption.59  This essay 
will consider rather how these prior cases failed to anticipate current laws 
imposing a new set of SPM ethics on religious educational institutions. 
Due to the particular questions before them, while these cases’ summary
holdings appear to spell trouble for religious schools, their animating 
principles provide hope.  Such principles include Smith’s overriding concern 
to avoid anarchy and Hosanna Tabor’s apprehension to allow religions
effectively to pass their faith on to the next generation. 
A. Smith 
It would appear from a summary of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Smith that religious schools enjoy little constitutional protection from 
laws affecting their rights to employ teachers who believe in and live the 
schools’ SMP mores.  The Smith majority stated: “[T]he right of free 
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 
‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law 
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes).’”60  Following Smith, in Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah the
Court held that laws are not neutral and generally applicable if they have 
a facially apparent intent to target religion or contain exemptions for 
56. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 
713 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
57. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV 1109 (1990). 
58. See, e.g., Rosalie Berger Levinson, Gender Equality vs. Religious Autonomy:
Suing Religious Employers for Sexual Harassment After Hosanna-Tabor, 11 STAN. J. C.R.
& C.L. 89, 106–09 (2015); Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic
and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183, 1233 (2014). 
59. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 839 (2012); Katherine Hinkle, Note, What’s in a Name? The 
Definition of “Minister” in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283, 336– 
38 (2013).
60. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 
455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)), superseded by statute, 
RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000bb to -4 (2012)). 
14
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others which indicate a preference for nonreligion over religion.61 
Employment nondiscrimination laws do not appear to have Lukumi-type 
flaws. It would seem, therefore, that they may burden religion unless they
fail a “rational basis” standard, which they are highly unlikely to do. 
But Smith’s holding rests upon a rationale that does not easily apply to 
employment laws affecting SPM.  First, the Smith majority feared that if
the prior free-exercise-protective standard—the “compelling state interest” or
Sherbert v. Verner62 test—was applied to all facially neutral laws, “anarchy”
would ensue.63  Plumbing this concern as it was further explicated in 
Smith, it appears that the Court was referring to criminal behavior, or, at 
the very least, to behavior easily agreed to be socially problematic.64  The
SPM behavior at issue in the religious schools context, however, is quite 
different. It involves behavior widely documented to be socially useful. 
In fact, there is nearly a consensus in the social science research today,
that the behaviors embraced by most religious traditions—and their 
associated family forms—produce the best emotional and educational 
results for children, as well as less crime and lower social costs generally.65 
The SMP teachings and behaviors promoted by religious schools, in fact,
were cherished and promoted nearly universally by both private and state
actors until quite recently. They include sexual abstinence outside of marriage
between a man and a woman and respect for the rights of children to be 
born of the relationship between their married parents so that they have
the best possibility of knowing and being reared by both of their parents.66 
Second, religious schools would be seeking an exemption respecting 
only persons who voluntarily seek employment with the religious institution, 
who, in turn, will influence children whose parents who have voluntarily
entrusted them to the religious institution, knowing about and even seeking
the message of sexual integrity in word and deed that the school can
provide. 
61.  508 U.S. 520, 542, 545–46 (1993). 
62.  374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). 
63. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. 
64. See id.
 65. MARY PARKE, CTR. FOR L. & SOC. POL’Y, ARE MARRIED PARENTS REALLY
BETTER FOR CHILDREN? 1, 8 (2003), http://www.clasp.org/resources-and-publications/states/
0086.pdf [https://perma.cc/4U3X-QW9G].
66. See discussion supra, Part I. 
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Let us consider the argument that the Smith decision was driven by a
fear of anarchy with elements quite inapposite to the situation of a religious 
school choosing personnel according to their mission. 
Preliminarily, it is important to note that Smith acknowledged that its 
ungenerous reading of the First Amendment was only a permissible, not
a required reading.67  The Court therefore invited the questions of what 
67. Regarding the fact that Smith’s reading was not the only permissible one, the 
Court’s treatment of First Amendment in that case says only:
[Plaintiffs] assert, in other words, that “prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion]” includes requiring any individual to observe a generally applicable
law that requires (or forbids) the performance of an act that his religious belief 
forbids (or requires). As a textual matter, we do not think the words must be
given that meaning.  It is no more necessary to regard the collection of a general 
tax, for example, as “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” by those citizens
who believe support of organized government to be sinful, than it is to regard 
the same tax as “abridging the freedom . . . of the press” of those publishing 
companies that must pay the tax as a condition of staying in business. It is a 
permissible reading of the text, in the one case as in the other, to say that if
prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not 
the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable 
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended. 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 (emphasis added) (comparing Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States,
394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (upholding application of antitrust laws to press), with Grosjean 
v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250–51 (1936) (striking down license tax applied only to
newspapers with weekly circulation above a specified level)).  Justice O’Connor’s Smith
concurrence agrees that the majority’s new rule is not required by the text of the First 
Amendment, observing the following: 
[This amendment] does not distinguish between laws that are generally applicable
and laws that target particular religious practices.  Indeed, few States would be
so naive as to enact a law directly prohibiting or burdening a religious practice 
as such. Our free exercise cases have all concerned generally applicable laws 
that had the effect of significantly burdening a religious practice. 
Id. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  First Amendment scholar Michael McConnell 
confirms that the Smith majority stated at most that its reading of the language of the Free
Exercise Clause was only a “permissible,” not a conclusive, reading: 
The Court does not deny that the broader reading, which would require exemptions,
is likewise a “permissible” reading.  Indeed, the Court does not even deny that 
it is the more obvious and literal meaning.  It is sufficient, according to the Court, 
that the words are not ironclad.  Having determined that the words are not
dispositive, the opinion then turns to the Court’s precedents and the text plays
no further role in the decision. 
See McConnell, supra note 57, at 1115.  Further buttressing the conclusion that its reading 
of the First Amendment was not the only one and that something else drove the Court to 
its conclusion is the fact that the Smith rule is not commanded by prior decisions.  The 
Smith majority even acknowledged that prior decisions employed a strict scrutiny analysis 
to evaluate neutral laws of general applicability that burdened religion.  See Smith, 494
U.S. at 884.  Justice O’Connor’s Smith dissent offered substantial detail: the Court had
“disregarded” a prior and lengthy set of cases in which the Court had “requir[ed] the
government to justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a 
compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Id. at
16
ALVARE (DO NOT DELETE) 9/10/2018 10:06 AM     
 




























   
    
[VOL. 53:  1, 2016] The Freedom to Teach 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
drove its conclusion—especially given its acknowledgement that it had 
previously applied a more free-exercise-protective rule68—and of what
protection is due religious freedom when anarchy is not the likely result 
of granting a religious exemption. 
That it was the fear of anarchy that drove Smith’s conclusion seems clear
on the face of the opinion. As constitutional scholar Michael McConnell has
written: 
The deepest and most important theme of the Smith opinion is its perception of a 
conflict between free exercise exemptions and the rule of law. . . .  [Smith] states
that to apply the compelling interest test rigorously “would be courting anarchy”
and warns against making “each conscience . . . a law unto itself.”69 
There is also a great deal of language in Smith anguishing over the potential 
for anarchy were religious freedom given generous play.  At the end and 
rhetorical climax of Smith, the Court stated: 
We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach in accord with
the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the [Sherbert] test inapplicable. . . .  
The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially
harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy,
894–95 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 
(1989); Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707, 718 (1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626–29 (1978) (plurality opinion);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 
462 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 
732 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); W. Va. State Bd. of 
Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)). 
 As Professor McConnell points out: 
Justice Scalia, fourteen months before writing the Smith opinion, stated in a
dissenting opinion in an Establishment Clause case that the Court had “held that 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required religious beliefs to 
be accommodated by granting religion-specific exemptions from otherwise
applicable laws,” listing four illustrative cases, including Yoder. Three of the
five Justices in the Smith majority signed their names to this statement.
McConnell, supra note 57, at 1121 (citing Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 38 
(1989) (Scalia., J., dissenting)). 
68. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
69. McConnell, supra note 57, at 1149 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 888, 890). 
McConnell further observes that this “rationale” is illogical because it would undercut the 
Court’s simultaneous approval of legislative exemptions; neglects to credit government’s 
continuing role in policing the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable exemptions, via
the compelling state interest and least restrictive means analyses; and fails to credit or
understand the historical documents and rationales grounding the First Amendment. Id. at
1148–52. 
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“cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious
objector’s spiritual development.”. . .  To make an individual’s obligation to obey 
such a law contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs,
except where the State’s interest is “compelling”—permitting him, by virtue of
his beliefs, “to become a law unto himself,”. . . contradicts both constitutional 
tradition and common sense. 
. . .  But using [the compelling state interest requirement] as the standard that must
be met before the government may accord different treatment on the basis of
race, . . . or before the government may regulate the content of speech, . . . is not
remotely comparable to using it for the purpose asserted here. What it produces
in those other fields—equality of treatment and an unrestricted flow of contending 
speech—are constitutional norms; what it would produce here—a private right 
to ignore generally applicable laws—is a constitutional anomaly.70 
The Court continued, spelling out a parade of horribles that might be unleashed
were strict scrutiny adopted as the constitutional test:
Moreover, if “compelling interest” really means what it says (and watering it
down here would subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many
laws will not meet the test.  Any society adopting such a system would be courting
anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society’s diversity 
of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them. 
Precisely because “we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost
every conceivable religious preference,” . . . and precisely because we value and
protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming
presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of 
conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.  The rule
respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious 
exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind—ranging
from compulsory military service [Gillette v. United States] . . . to the payment 
of taxes [United States v. Lee]; . . . to health and safety regulation such as
manslaughter and child neglect laws [Funkhouser v. State], . . . compulsory
vaccination laws [Cude v. State], . . . drug laws [Olsen v. Drug Enforcement 
Administration], . . . and traffic laws [Cox v. New Hampshire]; to social welfare 
legislation such as minimum wage laws [Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. 
Secretary of Labor], . . . child labor laws [Prince v. Massachusetts], . . . animal
cruelty laws [Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah and State 
v. Massey] . . . environmental protection laws [United States v. Little], . . . and
laws providing for equality of opportunity for the races [Bob Jones University v. 
United States]. . . . The First Amendment’s protection of religious liberty does
not require this.71
 70. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884–86 (emphasis added) (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 167 (1878)).
71. Id. at 888–89 (emphasis added) (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606
(1961)).
18
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It should also be noted that other strong candidates for the role of “Smith’s 
controlling rationale” are absent, as several scholars have noted:72  the  
Smith Court, for example, chose only a possible–but–permissible reading
of the First Amendment; the Court acknowledged that it had previously
applied the stronger strict scrutiny analysis to neutral laws of general 
applicability burdening religion; and the opinion exhibited a lack of
convincing prior First Amendment precedents.73 
Drawing upon the above excerpts, therefore, we can see also that the 
Smith majority concluded that narrow religious freedom protection was 
warranted and anarchy more likely, when a religious actor seeks an
exemption from a criminal law, or at least a law banning readily recognizable
harmful behavior, unleashed upon the public. 
The Smith opinion highlighted the character of the law before it as
“criminal” or “socially harmful” several times.74  It stated that respondents 
were “contend[ing] that their religious motivation for using peyote places 
them beyond the reach of a criminal law.”75  It observed that “[e]ven if we 
were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment 
compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a 
generally applicable criminal law.”76  And regarding its prior First Amendment 
cases, it stated: “[w]hether or not the decisions are that limited, they at 
least have nothing to do with an across-the-board criminal prohibition on
a particular form of conduct.”77 
The majority also characterized the law from which religious actors
sought exemption as banning “socially harmful conduct,” saying:
The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially
harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, 
“cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious
objector’s spiritual development.”. . .  To make an individual’s obligation to obey
such a law contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, 
except where the State’s interest is “compelling”—permitting him, by virtue of
 72. See also McConnell, supra note 57, at 1149 (concluding that the Court’s concern
with anarchy and its own disinclination to adjudicate the balance between religious freedom
and states’ interests were the centerpiece of the majority’s reasoning in Smith).
73. Smith, 494 U.S. at 893–96 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
74. Id. at 884–85. 
75. Id. at 878. 
76. Id. at 884 (emphasis added). 
77. Id. (emphasis added). 
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his beliefs, “to become a law unto himself,”. . . contradicts both constitutional 
tradition and common sense.78 
Justice O’Connor’s Smith dissent also highlighted the significance of 
there being a criminal law at the heart of the case.  She acknowledged the 
majority’s hesitation to apply a compelling state interest analysis79 to an 
“across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct” 
and emphasized that Oregon’s law was intended for the “prevention of
harm” to citizens, saying, “Oregon’s criminal prohibition represents that 
State’s judgment that the possession and use of controlled substances,
even by only one person, is inherently harmful and dangerous.”80 Finally, 
she characterized Smith’s holding as follows: “where the law is a generally
applicable criminal prohibition, our usual free exercise jurisprudence does
not even apply.”81 
The Smith majority’s above-quoted list of “horribles” that religious 
exemptions could allow also supports the conclusion that for the most 
part, although not exclusively, the Court was concerned about opening the 
door to long-agreed intrinsically and socially disapproved behaviors, unleashed
upon a wider public.  The majority cited the ability to avoid military
service, minimum wage, vaccines and the payment of taxes, and the ability
to commit manslaughter, animal cruelty, child neglect, child labor, drug
and traffic offenses, environmental pollution, and racial discrimination.82 
Of course, it has never been held that the Smith rule is inapplicable to
any but a criminal law or a law banning only certain types of social harm. 
But this is language repeated often enough in the Smith opinion and tied 
logically enough to its fear of anarchy that it merits consideration in
connection with any inquiry about the scope of Smith—particularly the
line between the externally harmful acts with which it was concerned and 
the internally directed acts which remain the province of religions, according 
to the next major First Amendment decision, Hosanna-Tabor. 
B. Hosanna-Tabor
In Hosanna-Tabor, a unanimous Court held that the Constitution required, 
as a matter of both the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses, a
“ministerial exception” forbidding the state even from adjudicating an
 78. Id. at 885 (emphasis added) (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)). 
79. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (applying a compelling 
state interest analysis). 
80. Smith, 494 U.S. at 892, 905 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see
id. at 872 (majority opinion). 
81. Id. at 892 (citation omitted). 
82. Id. at 888–89 (citations omitted).
20
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Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim by a former employee 
teacher at a religious school.83  The Supreme Court acknowledged in 
Hosanna-Tabor that the ADA was a neutral law of general applicability— 
the types of laws ordinarily subject to a Smith analysis—but distinguished
the case from Smith: 
It is true that the ADA’s prohibition on retaliation, like Oregon’s prohibition on
peyote use, is a valid and neutral law of general applicability. But a church’s
selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s ingestion of peyote. Smith
involved government regulation of only outward physical acts.  The present case,
in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church decision
that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.  See [Smith] (distinguishing
the government’s regulation of “physical acts” from its “lend[ing] its power to 
one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma”).  The 
contention that Smith forecloses recognition of a ministerial exception rooted in
the Religion Clauses has no merit.84 
Discussions of Hosanna-Tabor regularly focus upon the scope of its 
ministerial exception.85  A complete analysis of the opinion, however, 
indicates that the Court’s overriding concern was to preserve religion’s 
ability to pass the faith on to future generations.  This theme not only 
emerges generally from the Court’s unanimous opinion but also best
accounts for the distinction it drew between the Smith scenario and the 
situation before the Hosanna-Tabor Court. 
Undoubtedly, the Hosanna-Tabor opinion regularly made observations 
directed narrowly to the impermissibility of state interference in the choice of
ministers. It stated that: “Both Religion Clauses bar the government from 
interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its 
ministers.”86 It added that the “Establishment Clause prevents the
Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause 
prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select 
their own.”87  Referring to an early controversy over the state’s power to
incorporate a church in Virginia, the Court referred to Madison’s veto
statement about the state eschewing involvement “comprehending even
 83. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 
694, 706 (2012). 
84. Id. at 707 (emphasis added) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 877). 
85.  See discussion, supra note 59. 
86. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702. 
87. Id. at 703. 
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the election and removal of the Minister of the same.”88  Reflecting on
church property precedents, it observed that “[o]ur decisions in that area
confirm that it is impermissible for the government to contradict a 
church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.”89  It summarized 
the problem before it as the “freedom of a religious organization to select
its ministers”90 and concluded its application of the law to the facts with 
the following: “Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the 
exception, the First Amendment requires dismissal of this employment 
discrimination suit. . . . By requiring the Church to accept a minister it
did not want, such an order would have plainly violated the Church’s
freedom under the Religion Clauses to select its own ministers.”91 
But many statements in the opinion are also concerned with the broader 
freedom of religions to control not only  “religious offices”92 and the
“selection of ecclesiastical individuals”93 more generally, but also with 
their control over the means of preserving and passing on the religion to 
the next generation. These statements reference in an overlapping fashion 
the right to determine both personnel and doctrine. As noted above, the 
Supreme Court has regularly in the past acknowledged this overlap as an
element of its reluctance to permit states to provide funds directly to 
religious schools.  The Court feared that funding teachers constitutes funding 
doctrine.  In Lemon v. Kurtzman,  for example, after describing the standards 
for teachers applied to the Catholic schools at issue—requiring them to
undertake “religious formation” upon students, which is not “restricted to
a single subject area,” and recognizing that the teachers are the “prime 
factor” for the schools’ success in transmitting the Catholic faith—the 
Lemon Court observed: “Given the mission of the church school, these 
instructions are consistent and logical.”94 
The marriage of doctrine and personnel is still a very prominent feature 
of religious schools. A very recent report, for example, describes policies 
in one hundred twenty-five U.S. Catholic dioceses insisting upon every
teacher’s subscribing to Catholic beliefs and practices as a prerequisite for 
88. Id. at 703–04 (quoting 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 983 (1811), http://memory.loc.gov/ 
cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llac&fileName=022/llac022.db&recNum=489 [https://perma.cc/
4TQT-THMA]).
89. Id. at 704. 
90. Id. at 705. 
91. Id. at 709. 
92. Id. at 702. 
93. Id. at 703 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Bishop Carroll (Nov. 20, 
1806), in 20 RECORDS OF THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF PHILADELPHIA
63, 63–64 (1909)). 
94.  403 U.S. 602, 618 (1971). 
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employment.95  That it is “lay” teachers who carry this out can hardly be
doubted.  Among all U.S. Catholic schools today, for example, only 2.8%
among approximately 151,000 teachers are clergy or avowed religious.96 
Catholic educational authorities both at the Vatican and in the United States 
recognize that the primary source for passing on the faith in Catholic 
schools is the teacher.97 
Hosanna-Tabor also cites Watson v. Jones, in which the Supreme Court 
held that religious freedom requires noninterference in matters of Church 
“discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.”98 Hosanna-
Tabor reiterated an earlier opinion’s characterization of Watson as radiating 
“a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from 
secular control or manipulation—in short, power to decide for themselves, 
free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those 
of faith and doctrine.”99  It recalled another case in which “this Court explained 
that the First Amendment ‘permit[s] hierarchical religious organizations 
to establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and 
government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these 
matters.’”100
 95. DENISE DONOHUE & DAN GUERNSEY, CARDINAL NEWMAN SOC’Y, FAITH AND
MORALS LANGUAGE IN CATHOLIC SCHOOL TEACHER EMPLOYMENT DOCUMENTS: A




96. NAT’L CATHOLIC EDUC. ASS’N., U.S. CATHOLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
SCHOOLS 2014–2015: THE ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON SCHOOLS, ENROLLMENT AND
STAFFING 23 (2015), https://www.ncea.org/data-information/catholic-school-data [https://perma. 
cc/JJU9-D7PX].
97. JAMIE F. ARTHUR, CARDINAL NEWMAN SOC’Y, THE CALL TO TEACH:
EXPECTATIONS FOR THE CATHOLIC EDUCATOR IN MAGISTERIAL TEACHING 2  (2015),
http://www.cardinalnewmansociety.org/Portals/0/K12%20Pages/Resources/The%20Call
%20to%20Teach%20by%20Jamie%20Arthur%20June%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B3TQ-6QZW]; The Religious Dimension of Education in a Catholic School, THE HOLY 
SEE (Apr. 7, 1988), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ccatheduc/documents/ 
rc_con_ccatheduc_doc_19880407_catholic-school_en.html [https://perma.cc/E9PS-Z87E].
98.  80 U.S. 679, 727 (1871), quoted in Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704. 
99. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704 (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of 
Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)). 
100. Id. at 705 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 
724 (1976)). 
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Most importantly, the Court explicitly tied its recognition of a ministerial
exemption to a religion’s ability to teach its faith, to pass it on.  Its most
complete explication of this conclusion is as follows:
The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers. 
Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a 
church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. 
Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the
church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By
imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause,
which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission 
through its appointments.  According the state the power to determine which 
individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which 
prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.101 
The Court’s application of the ministerial exemption to the plaintiff at 
issue in Hosanna-Tabor also foregrounded that it was the teaching of the 
faith that was the essential religious task with which the state should not
interfere.  Said the Court: the plaintiff had a “role in conveying the
Church’s message and carrying out its mission”;102 she “transmit[ed] the 
Lutheran faith to the next generation.”103 When characterizing the interests 
on both sides of the debate—employment discrimination and religious
freedom—the Court summarized religious groups’ interests as determining 
“who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their
mission. . . .  The church must be free to choose those who will guide it
on its way.”104  Finally,  Hosanna-Tabor most effectively expressed its
overarching interest in leaving religions alone to pass on their faith in the 
part of the opinion where the Court relied upon the Establishment Clause 
while distinguishing the instant case from Smith: 
Smith involved government regulation of only outward physical acts. The present
case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church 
decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.105 
According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the
faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government
involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.106 
By relying upon the Establishment Clause, the Hosanna-Tabor Court 
underscored its conviction that religious institutions’ personnel choices are
internal policy; questions concerning links between government and internal
 101. Id. at 706 (emphasis added). 
102.  Id. at 708. 
103. Id.
 104. Id. at 710. 
105. Id. at 707. 
106. Id. at 706. 
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religious operations are the type of First Amendment questions that 
nonestablishment principles adjudicate. The concurrence of Justices Alito
and Kagan strongly emphasized this theme.  In describing what they intended
by supporting a “functional” notion of ministry, these Justices again and 
again underscored the function of passing on the faith, identifying as within 
the ministerial exemption personnel who engage in the “critical process 
of communicating the faith,” who “serv[e] as a messenger or teacher of its 
faith,” and who are “entrusted with teaching and conveying the tenets of
the faith to the next generation.”107  Whether or not they bear the title
of minister is deemed irrelevant.108 
Obviously, the dichotomy expressed in Hosanna-Tabor—between
outward physical acts and internal church decisions affecting the faith and 
mission of the church itself—is not always crystal clear.  For example, the 
use of the illegal drug at issue in Smith might have both external effects
and internal (sacramental) repercussions.  At the same time, it is also easy
to observe that the choice of religious schools’ instructors relevant to SMP 
is quite easily understood as “internal.” It does not affect citizens at large, 
but only citizens who have voluntarily requested employment at a religious
school, and who regularly sign contracts containing morality or integrity
clauses, as well as the children of adults who have also voluntarily selected a
religious school. 
C. Title VII and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
There are two additional avenues for granting religious freedom protection
to religious educational institutions: Title VII’s religious employer exception 
and various states’ Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, or state constitutions 
preserving a more religion-protective view.  Neither is fully sufficient, 
considering what is at stake for religions and for parents. 
Title VII bans employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, 
religion, color, and national origin.109  Religious employers have an exception 
permitting them to make employment decisions based upon religion.110 
But several courts have rendered Title VII’s exemption weak by holding
that—even in cases where it is indisputable that a particular teacher’s
behavior violates the school’s religion and the agreement the teacher
 107. Id. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring). 
108.  See id. at 713. 
109.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
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signed with the school—a court could determine that sex or pregnancy 
discrimination instead governed the personnel decision.  In this way, a 
teacher who had contractually agreed to observe particular religious 
principles could win the legal right to be reinstated at a religious school.
Furthermore, courts have reached the conclusion that something other
than a religious disagreement was the governing factor in a teacher’s 
dismissal, by comparing a school’s response to several employees’ varying 
violations of religious principle, and evaluating whether these responses 
exhibit differential treatment by sex.  In Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne, 
Indiana, for example, the court engaged in theological speculation about 
whether an employee’s repeated use of an artificial reproductive technology
was morally equivalent in the Catholic faith to another employee’s being 
taken to a strip club for a pre-wedding party or equivalent to a hypothetical 
encounter in which a priest discovered that a male employee was using 
birth control.111 Evaluating the similarities and differences between differing 
violations of a particular religion’s moral code and a religion’s response 
to each, however, is a strictly theological inquiry and thus outside of 
judicial competence.  That Title VII is being interpreted to allow this type 
of inquiry renders Title VII an insufficient tool for safeguarding religions’ 
need to appoint their own teachers. 
RFRA is another possible solution for religious schools.  RFRA requires
even a neutral, generally applicable law that burdens religion to demonstrate
a “compelling state interest” carried out by the “least restrictive means.”112 
On its face, such a test should provide more religious freedom protection 
to schools than a “rational basis test.”  Yet even the “compelling state 
interest” test on its face can be applied arbitrarily,113 and there is no guarantee 
that the religious objection will survive; this is especially so considering 
the modern zeitgeist regarding same-sex marriage and contraception. 
111. No. 1:12-CV-122 RLM, 2015 WL 1013783, at *1–*4 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 19, 2015).
112.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 
113. See Steven D. Smith, Playing Around with Religion’s Constitutional Joints, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 123, 124 (2008). 
In this diffuse discursive economy, rhetorical resources are available to support
professionally respectable arguments for virtually any reasonably sane conclusion 
—and compelling arguments for none. . . .  Still, at the end of the day, there just 
is not much to say—no sufficiently definite standards or authorities to appeal 
to—that could or should convince anybody who is not independently inclined 
toward a particular advocate’s point of view.
. . . .
. . . Under the current conditions of religion-clause discourse, ‘respectable 
but uncompelling’ is probably as much any such normative argument can realistically
aspire to be: an argument can fall short of that mark but cannot readily surpass 
it.
Id. at 124, 125, 132–33. 
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Schools should be able to survive a compelling state interest analysis, 
given how small is the state’s interest in vindicating same-sex marriage or
other sexual expression rights within voluntary communities of faith
where believers don’t create social scandal by refusing to accept such
sexual ethics. It is rather widely understood and expected that they will
not.  And in fact, the behavior of students who obtain their sexual information
from religious sources is not only healthier for them, but also for their
communities.114  But Justice Kennedy’s soaring and highly emotional
language in Obergefell about how the “dignity” and “self-definition” of 
LGBT persons is inextricably tied up with a marriage entitlement115 and 
the federal government’s recent equating of child-free sexual expression
with women’s social equality116 make a “compelling state interest” contest 
more than a little uncertain.  Not to mention that prior champions of RFRA 
are withdrawing their support,117 and more and more politicians and interest
groups are consigning it a place with Jim Crow, while LGBT activists 
threaten to “firebomb” small businesses that won’t cooperate with same-
sex weddings.118 
There is also evidence that the Supreme Court might not engage in too 
searching an inquiry regarding “compelling state interests” when sexual
expression is on the table. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, for example, the 
Court held that the government had not satisfied the “least restrictive
means” prong of RFRA.119  However, it seemed willing in dicta to believe
the federal government’s very generally expressed “compelling interest” 
in forcing a few religious objectors to provide free contraception on the 
grounds that U.S. women’s social and economic equality would otherwise 
be threatened,120 even in the face of evidence that contraception use is 
114. Bleakley, supra note 40, at 37 (“[L]earning about sex from . . . religious leaders 
was associated with beliefs likely to delay sex.”).
115.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–2607 (2015). 
116. See Brief for Petitioners at 46, 49, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 173486, at *46, *49. 
117.  See Melling, supra note 13. 
118. Shekhar Bhatia, ‘If a Child of Mine Was Gay I Would Love Them, But I Still 




119. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2780. 
120. Id. at 2779–80. 
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III. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to locate simple and firm constitutional or statutory grounds 
for leaving religious schools free to determine the faculty who will transmit 
the faith to the next generation in an effective way.  Considering, however, 
the important role that teachers play in the task of faith transmission, it is 
important to review potential grounds. 
The campaigns by governments and interest groups to shift social mores 
concerning SMP reached their logical conclusions in record time.  While 
just “yesterday” civil law and most religions agreed on the importance of
linking sex with marriage with parenting, now the law insists instead that
to honor these links is to disrespect women as well as citizens who identify
as LGBT. The value of sexual expressionism—consensual sex unlinked 
to marriage and children—is ascendant.  Religions offering education to
a wide swath of citizens as a matter of service are now instructed to conform 
to the new ethic, even while many of its consequences have proved
disastrous to the least-privileged Americans who have most adopted it.122 
As discussed at length above, it is incorrect to conclude that the Smith
Court would disparage religious schools’ claims to religious freedom 
respecting personnel, or immediately see the “compelling” quality of a
governmental interest in forcing religious schools to obey nondiscrimination
laws grounded in a new state-approved sexual ethic, parts of which are 
untested and parts of which can safely be classified as harmful.  It is
incorrect to conclude that Hosanna-Tabor is more interested in an
employee’s ordination than in his or her role passing on the faith.  Still,
extant RFRA and Title VII law has not reflected these interpretations of 
the leading modern religion cases.  In order to protect the integrity and 
freedom of religious teaching, the Court should consider more specific 
solutions than it has offered in the past. 
A few possibilities are as follows: the most efficient option may be a 
blend of Justice Thomas’s recommendation in his Hosanna-Tabor
121. Helen M. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest: The “Birth Control” Mandate and 
Religious Freedom, 58 VILL. L. REV. 379, 398-405, 408-11, 426 n.238 (2013) (citing
statistic from Jo Jones et al., Current Contraceptive Use in the United States, 2006–2010, 
and Changes in Patterns of Use Since 1995, NAT’L HEALTH STAT. REP., Oct. 18, 2012, at 
16 tbl.3, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr060.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P27-ML8G]).
122. CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA 1960– 
2010, at 149–67 (2012). 
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concurrence- to rely upon the religion’s own designation123—with my
recommendation to interpret that case as upholding religions’ right to pass 
on the faith. To limit the Court’s exemption to a more narrowly defined
category of ministers or to overlook the very real role that teachers play
in transmitting the faith, effectively closes off one of the few avenues that
religions and parents realistically possess against the overwhelming 
influence of media and government. 
A second possibility: perhaps the Court will have to enter into the dreaded 
“hybrid rights” territory so barely sketched out in Smith. There the Court 
acknowledged that it could not ignore the strong religious freedom
protection given to the Amish parents in Wisconsin v. Yoder.124  Perhaps
simply to preserve Yoder, the Smith majority announced a category of “hybrid” 
rights cases in which the presence of two constitutional rights together—as
distinguished from religious freedom alone—merited “compelling state 
interest” analysis.125  While the hybrid-rights category has been regularly 
disparaged as unclear or even intellectually impossible, it has not been 
explicitly overruled.126 
Perhaps religious schools’ situation today respecting SMP is close enough 
to Yoder—where both religious freedom and parents’ rights to educate their
children are at stake—that the category could be used again.  Smith said 
the following: 
[T]he First Amendment [has barred] application of a neutral, generally applicable 
law to religiously motivated action . . . involv[ing] not the Free Exercise Clause
alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections, . . . Pierce v. Society of Sisters . . . [the right of parents] to direct the education
of their children, [and] Wisconsin v. Yoder, . . . (invalidating compulsory school-
attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to
send their children to school).127
 123. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 
710–11 (2012).
124.  406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
125. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990), superseded by statute, 
RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
200bb to -4 (2012)). 
126. Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a “Rule” Doesn’t Rule: The Failure of
the Oregon Employment Division v. Smith “Hybrid Rights Exception,” 108 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 573, 605 (2003). 
127. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925)). 
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The Yoder opinion indicates that the Court accepted the proposition that
to fail to allow parents the religious freedom they sought would be tantamount
to allowing the state to “influence, if not determine, the religious future of 
the child.”128  A similar claim might be made here by religious schools,
particularly regarding the state’s new SMP ethics, which intersect quite
foundational and wide-ranging aspects of Judeo-Christian religions. 
128. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232. 
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